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This paper aims to illustratethe viability of using concepts and theoretical

argumentsfrom organizationecology to analyze dynamic changeprocesses
in foster care. The general topic is the relationshipbetween foster homes
and their environments. The specificfocus is the effects of the environment
on the entry and exit patterns of newfoster homes. Drawingon our earlier
studies of the 23 year history of a population offoster homes, various hypotheses shown to have validity in accountingfor the processes underlying
thefounding anddisbandingofformal organizations,also apply in the case
of the entry and exit processesoffoster homes. One importantcontribution
of this paper is in re-asserting the role of theory in studying foster care,
and in helping organizeexisting knowledge. A second contribution is in
reminding us thatfoster homes should be conceptualized and studied as
existing in relation to their social context. They are embedded in social
and organizationalcommunities, and the nature of this embeddedness has
importantimplications not only for understandingtheir behavior but also
for how they should be approachedin policy terms.

INTRODUCTION
Recent literature in the field of child welfare leaves little doubt
that the system of foster care is under severe stress. Yet foster care
is seen as having too much value to simply abandon in favor of
other forms of care. The need, experts argue, is for new ways
to attract foster families, along with new ways to support and
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strengthen their capacity to persist in the difficult task of caring for
others' children (Child Welfare League of America, 199 1; Ontario
Association of Children's Aid Societies, 1988).
The system's problems, though perhaps increasingly critical,
are not new. Since the 1960's, the literature has been replete with
articles documenting the decline in the numbers of foster homes,
and identifying factors affecting the willingness of families to
become and remain foster homes. A review of the literature reveals a problem-oriented approach with two dominant foci. In
one approach, the individual foster home is selected as the unit
of analysis, with researchers studying the social, economic and
psychological factors which affect any given family's reasons for
becoming and remaining, or ceasing to remain a foster home
(e.g. Boyd and Remy, 1979; Poulos, 1972; Jones, 1975; Whiehe,
1982). The second type of study focuses on the activities of child
welfare agencies and government in their efforts to recruit and
retain foster families (e.g. Smith and Gutheil, 1988; Moreland,
Reid and Chamberlain, 1992; Titterington, 1990). Implicit in both
approaches is the belief that the behavior of major actors best
explains and addresses occurrences and problems in the field of
fostering.
These problem/solution foci on the individual foster family
and on the actions of agencies and governments have flourished,
overshadowing earlier calls (Fanshell, 1966) for the development
of theories of fostering that would seek to understand the dynamics of foster care itself. Only recently have researchers begun
to pursue this avenue, expanding their focus to ask questions
about how broader environmental conditions affect the patterns
of foster home entries and exits, thereby influencing the overall
supply of foster homes and the stability within the foster care
system (Campbell and Downs, 1987; Market Facts of Canada,
1981; Simon, 1975; Tucker and Hurl, 1992).
This paper reports research developed along the lines of this
more recent orientation. Using concepts and theories drawn from
organization science we attempt to construct a framework in
which micro-level analysis of the behavior of individual social
actors is complemented by macro-level analysis of the overall
dynamics of population change. In this paper, we integrate and
expand analysis and findings from our earlier work on the cir-
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cumstances surrounding the entry and exit processes of foster
homes in a child welfare system (Tucker and Hurl, 1992; Tucker,
Hurl and Ford, forthcoming). In addition, we comment on the
implications of our findings for policy and practice in foster care
as well as for future research directions.
THE STUDY POPULATION
The study population comprises all new foster homes associated with the Children's Aid Society of Hamilton-Wentworth,
Ontario, Canada, in the period January 1968 to June 1990. We
define a foster home as a fancily that is paid to provide continuous
substitute care for children in a natural family setting. Population
size is 629. Similar to other populations of foster homes, this
population is quite diverse. It includes single parent as well as
two parent families from a wide variety of religious and ethnic
backgrounds. Approximately 20 percent had formed as families 5
years or less before becoming foster homes and nearly 50 percent
had formed more than 10 years before entry. Finally, at the time
of entry, over 70 percent of the foster mothers were not working
outside the home.
DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS
Like other types of social actors, foster homes can be studied
at different levels of analysis. To date, they have been mainly studied at either the social-psychological or structural level, meaning
that the focus has been on explaining individual behavior within
foster homes or on explaining features and processes that characterize individual foster homes. Here we focus on foster homes
at a population level of analysis. A population is an aggregate of
social actors that share some common characteristic, for example,
all foster homes associated with the public child welfare system
in the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth. Our basic
objective is to explain the population-level attributes of patterns
of entries and exits. An entry is defined as the point at which a
home, after a successful application, is officially available to take
children requiring care. An exit is said to have occurred when a
foster home is formally closed and is no longer eligible to receive
pay for caring for children. Our use of the terms entry and exit,
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and not the more conventional terms of recruitment and retention
is deliberate. Recruitment and retention describe the activities
of child welfare agencies whereas entries and exits are activities
of foster homes. Failing to distinguish between the meanings
of recruitment and retention and entry and exit obscures the
significant empirical question of how factors additional to the recruitment and retention activities of child welfare agencies affect
the patterns of entry and exit of foster homes.
Key concepts used to analyze patterns of entries and exits
mainly refer to institutional and ecological components of the
environment in which foster homes are embedded. Institutional
components refer to socially created conceptions of appropriate
fostering practices, competencies, and behaviors that are supported and reinforced by significant institutional actors such as
governments, child welfare agencies, and relevant professional
bodies and associations. Ecological components define foster home
environments in terms of the availability and distribution of resources. Important ecological variables include density, the numbers of foster homes operating at a given time in the population,
demand, the difference between the numbers of children coming
into care and the number leaving care in a given unit of time,
and economic incentives, adjustment in payment schedules aimed
at making fostering an economically viable career option.
FOSTER HOME ENTRIES
Figure 1 shows the pattern of foster home entries by quarter
for the period January 1968-June 1990. The overall pattern is one
of increasing entries until the mid 1970s, followed by a period of
decline until the early 1980s, at which point entry rates tend to
stabilize. Within this general pattern, the data show frequent alterations of peaks and valleys, indicating the possible existence of
cyclical processes at work within the population of foster homes.
In looking to the foster care literature to explain these findings,
we found there has been little direct study of factors influencing
the entry of new foster homes into the child welfare system.
Instead, researchers have tended to deal with the topic of foster home entries on a more indirect basis, using findings from
research on other aspects of foster care to suggest hypotheses;
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about what might explain changes in numbers of entries. There
has been little emphasis on testing such hypotheses directly.
Figure 1:
Foster Home Entries by Quarter,1978-1990
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Significantly, researchers who do use empirical findings to derive hypotheses about foster home entries emphasize the importance of external or environmental factors, such as low pay rates,
competition from other public services, and legislative changes
that impose increasing demands on foster homes (Campbell and
Downs, 1987; Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies,
1988; Simon, 1975). We build on this earlier research, incorporating such factors into our examination of how selected institutional
and ecological components of the environment affect the entry
rates of foster home. We conceive of the environment as comprised of superordinate as well as intrapopulation dimensions.
The superordinate dimension of the environment refers to aspects of the general environment in which the overall population
of foster homes is embedded. It encompasses broad social and
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economic conditions, as well as such factors as significant institutional actors, e.g., relevant departments of government and/or
regulatory agencies, and relational networks of other types of
social actors. The intra-population dimension refers to interdependencies among population members. It encompasses considerations of factors like levels of intra-population competition,
cooperation, and information exchange. We examine four arguments concerning the effects of foster home entries of superordinate environmental variables, and two arguments concerning the
effect of intra-population variables.
Our arguments concerning superordinate environmental
variables include both ecological and institutional components. In
the ecological category, we deal with the possible effects on entry
rates of economic incentives, changes in the role of women and
in the nature of child welfare caseloads. Regarding institutional
aspects, we consider how the actions of government in changing
child welfare legislation may have affected the entry rates of
foster homes. We study the effect on entry rates of economic
incentives to determine whether earlier findings based on cross
sectional data indicating a positive relationship hold up when
longitudinal data are used in the analysis. An important reason
for studying changes in the role of women and changes in the
nature of caseloads is that, in both cases, it is generally believed
that changes are responsible for declines in the numbers of foster
home entries. However, to our knowledge, these claims have
not been demonstrated empirically. We study the role of government because other research has established that the actions
of various agencies and programs of government have important
implications for understanding the occurrence of change in the
human service sector (Hurl and Tucker, 1986; Tucker, Singh and
Meinhard, 1990; Baum and Oliver, 1992).
Our ecological argument concerning intra-population processes deals with the possible effects of change in the overall
size of the foster home population (density) a nd change in numbers of children coming into care (demand). We study density
because research on other populations of social actors has shown
it has having important explanatory power in relation to the rate
new entrants join such populations. We study demand because
it seems logical that changes in the numbers of children in care
would have a bearing on foster home entries.
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Our general approach to modelling the effects on entries of
superordinate and intra-population variables is outlined in the
appendix. More detailed discussion can be found in our earlier
published work (Tucker and Hurl, 1992).
SuperordinateEnvironmentalFactors
Economic Incentives - The argument around increased rates of
pay to foster homes suggests that foster parents, like others, are
interested in self-advancement and want to be paid adequately for
their work. Hence, higher pay will make the work more attractive,
thereby attracting others to become foster parents (Campbell and
Downs, 1987; Moreland, Reid and Chamberlain, 1992; Simon,
1975). This was a relatively simple argument for us to test because
in the case of our population of foster homes a major increase
in pay rates was initiated in September of 1973. The overall average rate increase for taking one foster child was in excess of
50 percent, with increases for different age-groups ranging from
30 to 65 percent. The rate for taking two children aged 12 or
over was increased by approximately 110 percent. These increases
were followed by routine reviews and regular increases over the
remainder of the study period. Surprisingly our analysis found
that economic incentives had no effect on entry rates.
We think there are two plausible explanations for this finding.
First, foster parents might be a unique population who, when
it comes to caring for the children of others, are not motivated
by self-interest. A second possible explanation is what we call
a "threshold of payment" view. This view posits that, though the
rates were increased substantially relative to the existing baseline,
they were not raised enough to attract families from outside the
usual pool of potential homes. This implies that if agencies are
to expand the pool of potential homes and increase entry rates,
they must raise their rates sufficiently high to attract families who
are currently exposed to more financially rewarding vocational
preferences.
Women in the paid laborforce- The second hypothesis we explored concerned the argument that increased participation of
women in the paid labor force resulted in fewer families being
available to become foster families. Given the significance of the
role of the mother in the decision to provide foster care (Fanshell,
1966) we expected our data to confirm this hypothesis. An ex-
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amination of reports of Statistics Canada on the 1968-1990 local
labor force participation rates of women ages 15-65 years showed
a substantial increase, from approximately 34 percent in 1968 to
over 60 percent by 1985, coinciding, it appears, with the decrease
in entry rates over the same period. However, when we subjected
the data to rigorous statistical analysis, we found no relationship.
Reflecting on this surprising finding, we have come up with
two possible explanations. First, as suggested above, it may be
that the pool of families from which foster homes come is a unique
subpopulation. For whatever reason, the women from the families in this pool may be unlikely to enter the paid labor force.
Thus, though increasing numbers of other women are entering
the paid labor force, women from this group are not. Second,
it may be that the measures we used (based upon estimates as
opposed to direct survey results), and the age categories they
covered, were too imprecise to provide the findings we expected.
We would note, however, that even if the measures were more
precise, they still may not provide the expected results. It is quite
possible, we believe, that the experience for many women of being
in the paid labor force may engender the motivation to contribute
economically to the family even once they return home to raise
and care for their own children. One possible way to do this is to
provide in-home care for the children of others, including foster
children. This implies, that in the long run, increases in the labor
force participation rates of women may lead to increased as opposed to decreased foster home entry rates. Generally speaking,
our findings and our reflections on this issue lead us to conclude
only that it is a highly complex issue that requires study in its
own right.
Change in CareRequirements - The basis of the third argument
we tested is the observation that families are discouraged from
becoming foster homes because children coming into care are
more difficult to manage. To test this argument, we examined how
change in the average monthly entry age of children coming into
care for the first time affects foster home entry rates. The underlying assumption is that a higher average age at entry implies that
the children coming into care will have relatively more problems,
resulting in fostering being more demanding and intrinsically less
rewarding. Our data showed that although the pattern is cyclical,
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with average age at entry going through several cycles of increase
and decrease, overall the average age at first entry did increase
over time. When we tested this increase against the corresponding
decrease of foster home entries, we found a statistically significant
relationship, thereby supporting the argument that change in
the nature of the child welfare caseload affects the propensity
of families to become foster homes.
InstitutionalChange - This argument is based on the idea that
institutional change in child welfare, as reflected in changes in
rules, regulations, and expectations pertaining to fostering, has
produced a set of assumptions about how families are supposed
to behave as functioning foster families that does not fit how many
actually behave before becoming foster families. This discourages
families from entering because it implies they will have to undergo some level of internal change.
The traditional theory of fostering argued that the main task
of the family was to provide the foster child with the experience
and benefits of normal family life. The foster child was to be
regarded as any other child in the family, subject to the authority
of the foster parents, and expected to conform to existing family
rules and processes. The child welfare agency accepted this view
and worked to support the foster family as a natural unit in its
relationship with the foster child.
More recently, this theory has been adjusted to one that conceives of foster care as a means to an end as opposed to an end
in itself No longer are foster homes to behave as autonomous,
selfdirecting family units. Instead they are now viewed more
as partners, cooperating with child welfare staff in setting goals
and implementing plans for the children in care. Moreover, the
relationship between foster child and foster home is different from
that of natural children. The home is monitored by the agency
to ensure that the family's behavior conforms with predefined
formal rules.
This change in the theory of fostering carries with it a change
in the conception of family as applied to foster homes. Generally families are treated as natural systems, with their formation
and functioning construed as reflecting the needs and interests
of family members. In contrast, families seeking to become foster homes now confront the expectation of functioning more as
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rational systems (Scott, 1991). That is, they can anticipate being
required to adjust at least some elements of internal structures and
processes so as satisfy the requirements of pursuing specific goals
and following formal rules not necessarily related to the needs
and interests of natural members. Because families can be expected to prefer not to threaten their own stability by entertaining
the possibility of changing processes and procedures they have
evolved to deal with the problems of family life, it is plausible that
the internal changes in family life implied by changes in rules and
regulations around fostering might actually discourage families
from entering the child welfare system as foster homes.
We tested this argument by including in our analysis a variable measuring institutional change in the context in which our
population of foster homes was embedded. This change was instituted in 1978 when the Child Welfare Act was amended by
the Ontario government in a manner that gave foster children
certain additional rights and protections. By setting in motion
actions where the rights and needs of the individual foster child
formally achieved increased priority against the collective rights
and needs of the foster home, this amendment created conditions
supportive of a fundamental realignment in the relationships between and among foster parents, foster children, and the agency
in the manner described above. If our theory is correct, the effect
of this amendment should be lower foster home entry rates. The
statistical analysis strongly supports this prediction. This raises
the paradoxical question of whether our attempts to expand the
individual rights of children are also helping to restrict options
with regard to the conditions under which they are being asked
to live.
IntrapopulationFactors
Although environmental factors investigated above help us
understand the overall decline in entry rates, they do not explain the cyclical pattern of peaks and valleys. To account for
these, we turned to the work of organization theorists. Currently,
organizational researchers mainly rely on an ecological theory
of organization to explain cyclical patterns of growth and decline in populations in resource-lifted environments (Hannan and
Freeman, 1989). In particular, ecological researchers propose that
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patterns of Soundings are regulated by population density, that
is, the numbers of organizations in existence at a particular time.
We also believe that demand, the pressure in the environment
supporting the creation of additional organizations, will have an
effect on entry rates.
Density - In organizational ecology, density is conceptualized
as influencing Soundings by setting in place legitimatization and
competitive processes that initially encourage and subsequently
discourage new organizational Soundings. In the case of foster
care we think the idea of density has importance as a way of
recognizing that there is an upper limit on the level of resources
available to support foster homes. In addition, we think the processes regulating these cycles are likely to involve the actions of
the agency with which the foster homes are associated and the
circulation of information about the opportunities and benefits of
becoming a foster home. When overall numbers of foster homes
are low relative to the agency's needs, we think it is likely that the
agency will try to increase entries. Fostering will be publicized
as an important task for which one can receive tangible and intangible rewards. Selection criteria may be relaxed. New foster
homes will find that children are placed with them with little or
no delay. Under these conditions, it can be predicted that entries
will increase.
Building on this, we believe there are incentives for child
welfare agencies to have available more homes than they can
actually use. A surplus of homes means that more emphasis can be
placed on matching child and home. Moreover, because opening
a home places less demand on an agency's resources than using
it, the availability of a surplus of homes has limited implications
for resource outlays by the agency. However, having a surplus of
homes may bring with it certain other consequences. Recruitment
efforts are likely to decline in intensity. Selection procedures may
stiffen, and workers may begin to filter inquiries on the basis of
what they understand the agency's more pressing needs to be.
These conditions may result in a decrease in numbers of subsequent entries. Overall, therefore, these arguments suggest that
the effects of changes in the total numbers of foster homes on
entry rates will be curvilinear, with lower numbers operating
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to increase entries but increasing numbers operating to decrease
them.
Demand - The argument that demand, or the difference between numbers of children coming into care and those leaving
care at any given time, effects entry rates complements the density dependence argument. When there is little or no increase
in demand, there is limited pressure on the agency to recruit
new homes. Indeed, selection criteria might tighten, and word
will get around that opportunities to foster are restricted. Under
these conditions, it is possible that rates of entry will decrease.
Moreover, initial increases in demand are unlikely to change the
pattern of decreasing entries. The agency will first draw on whatever surplus capacity it has and work to increase its existing
capacity-for example, by appealing to existing foster homes to
take additional children. However, these options lose their viability as demand continues to rise. Under these conditions, it is likely
that additional effort will be diverted into recruiting new homes.
Subsequently, the pattern of foster home entries will increase.
Based upon these arguments, we suggest that, like density, change
over time in demand will also have a curvilinear effect on foster
home entries. However, the effect will be reversed-low levels
of demand will be associated with decreasing rates of entry, but
increasing levels of demand will result in increasing rates of entry.
When we tested our data to ascertain the validity of both
the density and demand arguments, we found that both were
significant factors in explaining the observed pattern of entry
rates. Entries increased when density was low and demand was
high; they decreased when density was high and demand was
low. Overall, therefore, it is clear that there are forces at work
within the population of foster homes, as well as in the context
in which it is embedded, that have significant effects on patterns
of entry.
FOSTER HOME EXITS
Of our population of 629 foster homes, 509, or nearly 81 percent, exited during the period of observation. Figure 2 presents a
plot of the instantaneous exit rates of the foster homes in our study
population. 1 I Note that the hazard, or the exit rate, is plotted as
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a function of age, and not as a function of chronological time
as is the case for entries. Two foster homes may be dissimilar
in the sense that one entered the system in 1980 and the other
in 1985, but similar in the sense that both exit the system at
age four. This is not to say that chronologically specific events
such as institutional change or adjustment in the rate structure
do not influence foster home exits. We have treated such events
as historical happenings in the life cycle of foster homes and
have analyzed their effects on exits rates by entering them into
statistical models as covariates. By combining in the analysis the
effects of both age and historical events, it is possible, for example,
to explore whether a change in government regulations affects all
foster homes equally, or whether older homes are better able than
younger homes to survive such change.
Figure 2:
Plots of Empirical Hazardfor Foster Homes
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Examination of figure 2 shows that the propensity to exit is not
random, but depends upon the age of a foster home. Overall, older
homes have a lower propensity to exit than younger ones. On a
more specific basis, propensity to exit is initially low, increasing
to a maximum at about age three years, declining to age six,
increasing again to age nine, and subsequently declining.
To explain our findings, we began by turning to the foster care
literature. While a number of studies suggests that new foster
homes are more likely to leave than older ones, explanations
tend to be inferential, positing a link between exits and such
factors as changing legislation, increasingly difficult children to
care for, and women in the work force (Campbell and Downs,
1987; Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies, 1988). To
our knowledge, prior to our earlier work (Tucker, Hurl and Ford,
forthcoming), none of these hypotheses has been tested empirically. Moreover, references to such factors relate to points in
historic time when individual relies might cease fostering; none
have been used to explain the apparently age dependent pattern
of exits that we found in our data.
FosterHomes and the Liability of Adolescence
One framework that may help explain the pattern of exits
described in figure 2 has been called by its originators the "liability of adolescence". This hypothesis holds that whether you
are dealing with organizations, relationships between people, or
foster homes, the relevant survivorship curve is nonmonotonic
in nature-initially it increases until it peaks, and then begins to
decrease. This is due to three considerations-conditions extant
at entry, a sorting process, and development of relation-specific
assets. With these in mind, we begin with the question of why
older homes would have a lower risk of exit. We propose two
answers, one dealing with the institutionalized nature of family
life and its bearing on the sorting process, and the second dealing
with the role of relationship-specific assets. Considering first the
nature of family life, much family behavior is habitualized action
in the sense that patterns of behavior used in solving the common
problems of familiy life are accepted as typical and appropriate by
familiy members and are most frequently automatically invoked
(Cherlin, 1978; Reiss, 1981). While such institutionalized behav-
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ioral patterns enhance family unity and stability, they also invoke
inertial pressures (Zucker, 1977) thereby making families resistant
to change. This would not be a particular problem for foster
families if caring for foster children were the same as caring for
one's own children. But it is not. Caring for others' children moves
caring into the realm of emotional labor (England and Farkas,
1986; Hochschild, 1979 and 1983; Lynch 1989 Nelson, 1990) meaning that caring adopts a purpose that is more instrumental than
merely the development of social bonds, and involves considerations of material or symbolic gain. As such, emotional labor
requires the differentiation of one's own feelings from those that
go with the job, and subsequently the determination of how to
govern and present them in a manner that other relevant parties
agree is right for the circumstances.
In the context of foster care, this is a particularly difficult
task. Involvement with young and perhaps troubled children
evokes strong emotions. Moreover, because this work is done in
the privacy of the home where external guidance and supervision
tend not to be available, care-providing families themselves need
to create relevant "feeling rules" governing the appropriate range,
intensity and duration of emotions.
Because of what they bring to the task by way of pre-existing
patterns of habitualized behavior, families will vary in their
capacities to make this transition to providing emotional labor.
Some families, perhaps because they have broader repertoires
of problem-solving routines, will persist. Other families, with
perhaps narrower and more rigid repertoires, will exit. In either
case, we think that few families are likely to have awareness of
whether they possess the capacity to deal with the requirements of
providing emotional labor before actually undertaking the task.
Because mismatches are likely to be detected earlier than later in
a family's care-providing tenure, risk of exit for any given family
will be negatively correlated with the length of its tenure. Thus,
what eventuates is a sorting process in which families that persist
in providing care for longer periods will have lower risks of exit
because poor fits will have been sorted out.
The second explanation of why risk of exit declines with age,
that of the presence of relationship-specific assets, is drawn from
both organization theory and economics (England and Farkas,
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1986; Fichman and Levinthal, 1991; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988;
Williamson Williamson, 1975). Relation-specific assets, developed
in the context of exchange relationships, entail learning how to
get along with a partner. They are specialized to the immediate
context, with limited utility outside it. In the case of foster care,
we construe these assets to include the development of communication patterns with other relevant social actors (e.g. child
welfare agency, other foster homes, community services) and the
development of interpersonal trust, as well as the development
of idiosyncratic knowledge, skills and understandings (Nelson,
1990). Because these assets accrue over time and have diminished
value in other contexts, the probability of exit should decrease
with the passage of time.
Alone, the two foregoing theoretical arguments help us understand why older homes have a lower risk of exit. However,
they do not account fully for the pattern of exits described in
Figure 2 as they imply a steadily declining pattern of age dependence for exits. The "liability of adolescence" theory, it must be
remembered, predicts an initial pattern of increasing exits before
decline sets in. This period, called the 'honeymoon' period, results
from conditions extant at founding that buffer the new endeavor
from the onset of age dependence effects. Applying this to foster
care, we believe that some of these conditions are particular to
the families, themselves, and constitute a stock of initial assets
they bring to the task of fostering; other conditions are external
to the families, and are realized as the particular environmental
conditions under which the families enter the foster care system.
The argument follows that the more assets a family has, or the
more conducive the environmental conditions at founding, the
longer the honeymoon period and the later the point of maximum
risk of exit. We test these predictions by identifying what we
believe are relevant family assets and environmental conditions,
and examining their effects on the duration of time lapsed prior
to the point of maximum risk.
Family Characteristicsas Initial Assets
The potential assets we identify are drawn from the child
welfare literature, and from our study on entries. To understand
the importance of these factors, we devised a means for measuring
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each, and tested for the significance of their effects on exit rates.
For more detailed discussion of methodology and methodological issues, refer to the Appendix and to our earlier works (Tucker,
Hurl and Ford, forthcoming). Our findings on the significance
of selected family characteristics are reported under model 1 in
Table 1.
Commitment - Our focus on commitment, defined as the
pledging of oneself to behavioral acts such that they become
less changeable (Keisler, 1971; Fichman and Levinthal, 1991) is
suggested by the reality of the circumstances surrounding the
care of children. Caring for children means taking on special and
sometimes legally enforced responsibilities. At the same time,
because child care is not regarded as requiring special talents, it is
not an economically rewarding job. These observations suggest
first, that the decision to care for others' children reflects at least
some emphasis on doing the job for its own sake. Second, because
caring for children is thought to be a relatively simple task, it will
be difficult to accept that you cannot do it. These two factors, a
willingness to do the job, as well as a desire to avoid the stigma of
failing in the 'natural' task of caring for children, are conditions
appropriate for inferring commitment (Salancik, 1977). Following from this, we expect a positive relationship between level of
commitment and initial propensity to exit.
To measure commitment, we used the family's initial orientation to caring for others' children. The families in our population
differed in how restrictive they were in establishing conditions
for caring for children. 20 percent of our families proposed very
specific conditions, stating they would only care for a certain child
or a certain type of child; the other 80 percent of families were
less restrictive, agreeing to care for a broad range of children.
We assume that a less restrictive orientation indicates a higher
level of pre-entry commitment. A care-provider who asserts, "I
am prepared to care for children" is behaving less equivocally
than one who says, "I am prepared to care for children if..."
Testing for the significance of commitment in our population, we
found that it had a significant positive effect on the length of the
honeymoon period. All families demonstrated an increasing rate
of exit over the initial 2-3 year period of fostering but families
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Table 1
Maximum-likelihood estimates of two-time period models of age
dependence in foster home exit rates, 1968-1990
(Standarderrors in parentheses)
Variable
Constant
Commitment
Family Age
Mother Employed
Training
Density
Demand
Economic Incentives
Institutional Change
Care Requirements
Scale parameter
Shape parameter
Log-likelihood Ratio
G2 vs. Baseline

Model 1

Model 2

Time Interval 1
1.161
0.029
(0.618)
(0.242)
-0.299* **
-0.354***
(0.079)
(0.080)
-0.025
-0.021
(0.062)
(0.049)
-0.118
-0.063
(0.094)
(0.101)
-1.753*
-0.875***
(0.202)
(0.191)
-0.005***
(0.001)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.535***
(0.148)
-0.466***
(0.134)
0.047
(0.079)
0.343***
0.451***
(0.041)
(0.056)
3.753***
2.307***
(0.684)
(0.519)
-756.63
-775.52
38.58
Time Interval 2

Constant
Scale parameter
Shape parameter
Log-likelihood Ratio
*p <.05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

1.387***
(0.237)
0.525***
(0.112)
2.090**
(1.017)
-170.05

1.387***
(0.237)
0.525***
(0.112)
2.090**
(1.017)
-170.05
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with higher levels of initial commitment reached the peak exit
rate at a later point in their tenure.
Training- For some time, child welfare agencies have stressed
the importance of adaptive problem-solving behaviors to successful fostering. To this end, many have instituted formal periods
of training for foster parents. This may take a variety of forms,
including formal instruction, support group sessions with experienced care providers, and observation and practice opportunities. We have two reasons for proposing training as an initial
endowment that will help buffer a family against quick exit. First,
training helps establish problems not only as expected, but also
as solvable. This creates an incentive for persisting in an effort
that might otherwise be abandoned (Nelson and Winter, 1982:
124). Second, training alerts the family that caring for others'
children is not the same as caring for one's own. While this will
not cause a fundamental shift in a family's existing repertoire of
problem-solving routines, it is likely to result in more deliberate decision-making about their use, thereby engendering potential for increased flexibility and adaptability (Nelson and Winter,
1982: 85). Overall, therefore, we predicted that receiving training
as an initial condition of caring for others' children will stave off
the decision to exit.
The Hamilton-Wentworth CAS initiated a program of formal
training and on-going support services for foster parents in 1985.
Intended to lower the risk of exit for new foster homes, this program allowed us to gauge the effects of training on our population
of foster homes. As we predicted, the training was a significant
factor in extending the initial honeymoon period. The combined
effect of introductory training and commitment was to extend the
honeymoon period by slightly over 10 percent, from 24.84 months
to 27.36 months.
Experience - Associated with the notion of training as broadening the flexibility or range of problem solving skills is that of
life experience. Because it takes time for families to develop their
routines and character, we believe it is reasonable to expect that
the family's longevity at time of entry will affect propensity to
exit. It is not immediately clear, however, what the effect might
be. Experience could serve to broaden one's repertoire, thereby
aiding the transition to emotional labor; alternately, it might serve
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to rigidify caring and coping patterns, thereby hindering the transition. With no clear basis for prediction, we looked to our data
in exploratory fashion.
To indicate family life experience, we used the measure of the
time elapsed from family formation (marriage) to date of entry
as a foster home. Approximately 80 percent of our families had
been constituted as families for 6 or more years before becoming
foster families. Upon testing for the significance of this in exit
patterns, we found it had none. In explaining this, it is possible
that older more experienced families were given more troubled
children to care for, thereby increasing the demands upon them
and the likelihood of an earlier exit. Concomitantly, less experienced families might have been given less troubled children to
care for, thereby decreasing their exit rates. The net result of such
actions might have been offsetting. Or perhaps our use of family
age was not a good indicator of experience. Better indications
might be number and age of a family's own children. Clearly,
more research is warranted in this area.
Mother working outside the home - We found in our study of entries that women's employment opportunities outside the home
did not decrease entry rates as expected. Nevertheless, it is plausible that whether the mother works outside the home will have
some effect on a foster home's longevity. The rationale for this
has both philosophical and instrumental aspects. Mothers who
remain at home to care for children are often thought to receive
more pleasure from and to be more committed to raising children.
In addition, at-home mothers can direct more time and energy
towards involvement with the child and its problems; at the same
time, they have fewer stresses and diversions caused by outside
employment. All of these factors led to the prediction that the
mother at home will have a negative effect on foster home exits.
Looking at our data, we found that 70 percent of the mothers
were not employed outside the home at time of entry When we
examined the effect of this on initial propensity to exit, again we
found no significant effect. Overall it made little difference, in
terms of propensity to exit, if the foster mother was employed
inside or outside the home at the time of entry. Given the presumed significance of the mother in the provision of foster care,
this is an interesting finding. By way of explanation, it could be
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that less troubled children were placed in homes where mothers
were otherwise employed, thereby avoiding many problems and
obligations, and reducing what otherwise might be a high risk
of exit. Or, it could be that foster fathers play a more significant
role than has been previously assumed. Clearly, this too, requires
further study.
External Environmental Conditions at Entry
In the same way that the assets a family brings to the task
of fostering may affect its initial propensity to exit, so might the
external conditions under which entry occurs. Some conditions
may lead to increased longevity and others may work against
it. In testing this argument against our data, we explored the
effects on exit rates of the following five factors: institutional
change, numbers of existing homes, i.e., population density, care
requirements, demand for homes, and economic incentives.
The findings for the effects on exit rates of external environmental variables are reported under model 2 in table 1. Before
commenting on the effects of specific variables, one general point
needs be made from this analysis. The difference between models
I and 2 in table 1 is that model 2 contains the effects of the external
environmental variables as well as the effects of selected family
characteristics (model 1). Thus, the null hypothesis of the external
environmental variables having no effect on exit rates can be
tested using the likelihood ratio test. The resulting G 2 value is
38.58, which is statistically significant. This means that adding
the effects of the external environmental variables to the model
significantly enhances its explanatory power. This supports our
general assertion that initial risk of exit for a foster homes is determined not only by its initial assets but also by external conditions
extant at the time it entered the child welfare system.
Institutionalenvironment - We earlier defined the institutional
environment of foster homes in terms of rules, regulations, and
expectations that govern the functioning of foster homes. Also, we
pointed out that over the period of our study there was change
in the institutional environment in the sense that government
enacted legislation requiring foster homes to behave more as
rational as opposed to natural systems. Earlier we noted that the
change resulted in deceased entry rates. The question here is how
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this institutional change affects foster homes' initial propensity
to exit. The "threshold of talent" argument from organizational
ecology suggests an answer.
As developed in organizational ecology (Tucker, Singh and
Meinhard, 1989), the "threshold of talent" hypothesis posits that
for every configuration of environmental conditions, there is a
minimum amount of talent and energy required for organizations
to be founded. Whereas favorable institutional environmental
conditions lower this threshold, making it easier for organizations
to get founded, unfavorable environmental conditions raise it,
making founding more difficult. Because it is easier to found
organizations when institutional conditions are favorable, more
organizations will come into existence that do not have the talent
to survive in the long run. Thus, when environmental conditions
change and become more demanding, these organizations are
more likely to be selected out, causing an increasing disbanding
rate. Conversely, under unfavorable environmental conditions
when it is more difficult to found organizations, fewer 'low talent'
organizations will be founded, and will subsequently demonstrate a lower propensity to disband.
Applied to foster homes, and considered in the context of
our liability of adolescence arguments, the threshold of talent
argument suggests that when institutional conditions are less
demanding, meaning that families enter without the expectation
of internal change because they are treated more as natural than
as rational systems, more relies not suited to the requirements
of fostering will enter the child welfare system. Subsequently,
however, these families are more likely to be sorted out. Hence,
favorable institutional conditions at entry will be associated with
a shorter honeymoon period. By the same token, under unfavorable institutional conditions when becoming a foster home is
more difficult, fewer "poorly fitting" families will enter, meaning that the length of the honeymoon period will be extended
because fewer homes will be sorted out. Hence, families coming
in prepared to care for children on a more instrumental basis are
less likely to exit quickly.
The findings under Model 2 in Table 1 support this argument.
The coefficient for institutional change is negative and statistically significant. This implies that the more demanding institu-
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tional conditions signifying the more rational approach to fostering lower a home's initial propensity to exit and, thus, lengthen
its honeymoon period.
Density - It will be recalled from above that density refers to
the numbers of foster homes extant at a given time. It indicates
that there is an upper limit on the availability of resources to
support foster homes (Tucker and Jurl, 1992:624). Based on this,
it is reasonable to expect that variation in density at founding
will affect foster homes exit rates. However, different views can
be identified regarding the nature of this effect. One view is that
the lower density at entry, the better the survival prospects of
the foster home and, thus, the longer the honeymoon period. The
rationale is that under conditions of low density (i.e. when there
are fewer foster homes already in existence), new homes are more
likely to have children placed with them. Also, the agency will
have more capacity to provide supportive services (e.g., fewer
homes assigned to each worker). Thus, new homes are more likely
to persist as they will be receiving income for caring for children as
well as support in dealing with transition problems. A competing
view is that when density is low, entry will be easier, resulting in
higher numbers of "poorly fitting" homes being sorted out of the
population. Following from this is the implication of a shorter
honeymoon period due to higher initial exit rates.
The findings under Model 2 in table 1 show the coefficient
for density as negative and statistically significant. This supports
the first argument that lower density at founding contributes
to a longer honeymoon period because it implies higher levels of support to new foster homes in dealing with transition
problems.
Demand - While it is reasonable to presume that differences
in demand at the time of entry will affect initial propensity to
exit, it is not clear a priori whether such difference will improve
or diminish survival prospects. Entry under conditions of low
demand, i.e., when there is limited or no change per unit of time
in the numbers of children coming into care, could mean delayed
or limited utilization, leading to higher initial exit rates due to
lowered motivation to continue. Alternatively, it could result in
lower initial exit rates because the fact of entry at a time of low demand suggests the presence of some unique and perhaps sought
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after capability that the agency subsequently works to retain. The
findings show demand as not having a statistically significant
effect on initial risk of exit, thereby supporting neither of these
arguments. We think this is an area of our research requiring
additional investigation.
Financial Incentives - Our findings on entries revealed that
the increased boarding rates instituted by the agency did not encourage more homes to enter the foster care system. Interestingly,
however, our data reveal that they did have a significant effect on
delaying the risk of exit. This suggests that economic incentives
do not play a role in explaining why families took on the task of
caring for others' children, but do play a role in explaining their
persistence. A plausible explanation of this is that the increased
pay helped offset some of the hardships involved and affirmed
fostering as having some status, factors logically associated with
lowering exit rates. This finding points to the not unreasonable
conclusion that in and of itself, altruism is not enough to have
people stick at hard work even though intrinsically they value it.
Care Requirements - We expected change over time in nature
of foster care required, indicated by variation in the average age
of children entering care for the first time, would have a positive affect on initial risk of exit, thus contributing to a shorter
honeymoon period. The rationale is straight forward. Older children impose more demanding care requirements, thereby making
fostering intrinsically less rewarding. In addition, it is more acceptable to admit that caring for older, troubled children is too
demanding.
The findings under Model 2 in Table 1 do not support this
argument as the coefficient for care requirements is not statistically significant. This suggests that the nature of children cared for
does not effect initial willingness to persist. Upon reflection, this
finding makes sense. Recall our finding that families' willingness
to enter is negatively effected by the changing nature of care
requirements. Here we find age of children requiring care as
having no effect. The implication is that families whose persistence is influenced by the kind of child they care for are selecting
themselves out and not entering the foster care system. Hence,
the factors influencing the longevity of homes that are founded
are items such as a family's initial commitment and the type and
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amount of support provided by the agency. Generally, it seems
that fostering is a task like many others. People persist in doing
it because they value it in and of itself, and because of external
support and incentives.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our study found that theory from organization ecology could
be used to organize and justify observations previously made in
the foster care literature regarding the effects of selected variables
on entry and exit rates of foster homes. In addition, it suggested
other avenues for research, notably selected environmental conditions and intrapopulation dynamics. In relation to entries, we
found support for our theoretical arguments that the changing
nature of the caseload and the changing role of foster parents
would negatively effect entry rates. We also found support for
our arguments that intrapopulation processes would effect entries. Specifically, foster home density and demand had significant curvilinear effects on entry rates, explaining the cyclical
patterns in our data.
In regard to exits, we found support for the liability of adolescence hypothesis that exit rates would show a curvilinear pattern
of age dependence, initially increasing and then decreasing. We
also found support for our arguments regarding the buffering
effect of initial assets. Both commitment and training had the
effect of extending the honeymoon period. Our arguments that
selected founding conditions would effect exits received mixed
support. Specifically, homes entering under conditions of higher
remuneration were significantly more likely to remain in the system longer. Also, density and the nature of the institutional environment were found to have a significant effect on exit rates.
There were predictions, however, from both foster care literature and organizational theory which were not borne out. For
example, the movement of women into paid labor outside the
home did not have the expected positive effects on entries or
exits; increases in remuneration rates did not have a positive effect
on entries though it did on exits. These unexpected findings and
others (e.g., the second period of high risk of exit from 6 to 9 years
into tenure; the failure of the changing nature of the child welfare
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caseload and increased demand for homes to lower exit rates)
point to the complexity of foster care and the need to conduct
further studies to aid in our understanding of particular aspects
of it and in our development of theories concerning its underlying
dynamics.
The notion of theory development, of course, raises the question of the generalizability of ecological organization theory to
other, dimensions of child welfare/foster care systems. We suspect that it can be used to guide research in other areas. However,
this carries with it the implication of additional methodological
work. For example, our use of increasing age as a measure of
"harder to care for children" might be changed to one of decreasing age and/or the presence of physical disabilities in agencies
dealing with increasing numbers of crack addicted babies; our
measure of commitment might be modified to include blood relationships, etc. Despite our suspicions of general ability, however,
the question is an empirical one which can only be answered by
the results of further studies.
Before closing, we would like to address some issues raised
by our research for policy, practice, and future research. First, we
believe that our research has direct policy implications. One of
these pertains to the provision of support and training for foster
parents. Our finding of a liability of adolescence suggests the possibility of dealing with foster homes in different ways, depending
upon where they are in the aging process. Pressures to exit are
greatest not on new or older foster homes, but on foster homes
in their "adolescence," after they pass through their honeymoon
phase, and begin to decide about their suitability to fostering. A
possible implication is that training programs for foster parents
should take on different primary foci, depending upon stage of
the foster home life cycle. Relatedly, it would seem appropriate
that these training programs be designed with the aid of adult
educators, who emphasize the relevance of imparting knowledge
appropriate to the context in which people find themselves.
Secondly, we need to pay more attention to the issue of foster
home reimbursement and its implications. Our studies suggests
that if agencies want to expand the numbers of foster homes
and attract a more career oriented foster parent, they will have
to consider raising payment schedules to levels that make them
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competitive with other forms of professional care giving. This
alternative has not only financial implications for agencies, but
also philosophical ones--do they want to move closer to a system that emphasizes the career and financial aspirations of foster
parents as opposed to their commitment to caring for children.
Our studies suggests that it would take a significant outlay of
resources to make this change. Moreover, even if higher pay is
successful in drawing on an enlarged pool of foster parents, our
study suggests that a shift away from the primary commitment to
child care as an end in itself might well have negative implications
on the longevity of newly attracted homes. As we note below,
it might also have consequences for the kind of care children
receive. Clearly, the issue of remuneration is highly complex.
Our studies also raises questions about current practices and
policies in relation to the placement and care of children. These
questions result not only from changes in the nature of fostering,
but from the pattern of exits from the foster care system. We have
posited that the orientation to the role of fostering is changing,
with the traditional natural systems view being replaced by a
rational systems perspective. Indeed, recent developments in professionalizing fostering imply the acceptability and perhaps the
superiority of caring for foster children under rational as opposed
to natural systems conditions. To our knowledge, however, there
is no research supporting this shift, or investigating its implications for children. Our research indicates one possible outcome
of this shift-a decrease in the number of homes from which
to choose in placing children. No doubt some would argue that
these fewer more professional homes provide better care, yet we
know of no research investigating the consequences for children
of being cared for under rational as opposed to natural conditions.
In a similar vein, questions might also be asked about the
consequence for children of the liabilities of adolescence found
in foster homes. Does being placed in a newer home as opposed
to an older home have implications for children in terms of their
mental health, prospects for being returned to their natural family,
and/or for subsequent propensities to five multiple placements?
Again, research is lacking in this area.
We have not attempted to address such questions in our study,
but we do believe we have highlighted their significance. Hope-
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fully, too, we have provided a framework that future researchers
might find useful in conducting additional studies at multiple
levels of analysis to investigate these and other pressing issues in
foster care.
APPENDIX
Methods of Analysis
This research tracks the time paths of change in a population
of foster homes, and assesses how changes over time in various
external and internal factors influence the shape of the time paths.
Consequently, we used dynamic forms of analysis to test the empirical implications of our arguments. We modeled foster home
entries as event count data resulting from a Poisson process. The
basic formulation is the Poisson regression model;

Pr(B = bt)

= e-;Abt

bt!

where bt is the number of Soundings that occur in time interval
t, X = ebxi and xi are measured covariates.
We used a gamma distribution as a model for patterns of
foster home exits. It has been used extensively across a variety
of research domains and has the advantage of allowing for the
description and estimation of both monotonic and nonmonotonic
patterns of exit. It also controls for unobserved heterogeneity or
the effect on the exit rate of unmeasured differences among foster
homes.
For the gamma distribution, we model the hazard function
using a Weibull model with gamma heterogeneity. This model has
a hazard function, h(t)gam, which breaks into two multiplicative
components:
h(t)gamma = S(t) . h(t)weibull,

s(t) = [1 + O(Xt)]
h(t)weibull = Xp(Xt)p -

- "/a ,

l ,

where p is the shape parameter of the gamma distribution, X is
a transformation of the intercept and covariates, such that , =
exp(a + PX), and p defines the scale parameter a, such that
p = 1/a. When 0 > 0, the gamma distribution provides an estimate of a nonmonotonic hazard rate, first rising, then declining.
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A gamma distribution with 0 = 0 collapses to a monotonically
declining Weibull distribution. In turn, a Weibull model with
p = 1(a = 1) collapses to a constant rate exponential model,
with h(t) = X. The further the shape parameter 0 deviates from 0,
he greater the effect of heterogeneity. If heterogeneity were not
controlled, the estimations could produce either inconsistent parameter estimates or inappropriate standard errors, with the latter
being the most common problem. All analyses were implemented
using the statistical package LIMDEP (Greene, 1992).
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Notes
1. The hazard rate can be thought of as "approximately" the probability of
an organization disbanding at a particular time, given that it has survived
until that time. Strictly speaking, however, it is not a probability but the
instantaneous rate of disbanding at each instant of an organization's life. It
is given by:
at t)
h(t) = Lim Pr(t, t + Atlalive
At-*O

At

where Pr(t, t + Atlalive at t) is the probability of disbanding between t
and t +A t, given that the organization is alive at age t.

